A Potential Cease-Fire and the New Regional Dynamic November 20, 2012 | 1603 GMT Summary The proliferation of players in the current Israeli-Hamas cease-fire negotiations highlight the major shift in the regional strategic environment since the fall of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, calling into question the sustainability of any potential truce. Analysis U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will be in Israel overnight Nov. 20 and rumors are rapidly spreading of an imminent cease-fire agreement. Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi has also confidently claimed Nov. 20 that "the war will end today," but statements out of Israel have been far more reserved. The Times of Israel, citing Egyptian intelligence officials, reported that Israel has rejected the cease-fire draft and that there will no news conference announcing a cease-fire tonight. The core dilemma remains: If Hamas or any other Palestinian entity can threaten Israel's major population centers with long-range Fajr-5 rockets, what guarantees can Egypt or another third party make to neutralize that supply and prevent further shipments? The fact that another Fajr-5 rocket was fired at Jerusalem on Nov. 20 while thousands of Israeli troops remain forward-deployed in preparation for a ground invasion adds urgency to this question. Stratfor has learned that the Egyptian cease-fire proposal that Clinton will be studying with the Israelis entails an agreement by the major Palestinian factions to cease rocket attacks against Israel. In return, Egypt would send monitors to Gaza to enforce the cease-fire -- though no details were provided on whether Egypt would secure or remove the remaining rockets from Gaza and what Egypt would do to prevent replenishments from entering Gaza if the border is reopened. Israel would discontinue its policy of targeted killings and, at a later stage, would allow the opening of the Rafah crossing on a regular basis. Rumors continue to percolate on the terms of the cease-fire proposal, and the above claims could not be verified, but these terms do fit with the likely parameters of the negotiation. The problem is that Israel does not trust the Muslim Brotherhood-led government to enforce the cease-fire agreement. As a result, the United States is taking a more active role in the negotiation. Egyptian diplomatic sources are claiming that the Palestinian Fajr-5 rocket arsenal is dwindling, but will the United States play a role in verifying the Egyptian figures and removing the rockets from Gaza? What role, if any, will the United States play in monitoring the Sinai-Gaza border for future weapons shipments? That much remains unclear. The role of Egyptian intelligence and military figures from the Mubarak era is critical in these negotiations. Though the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been in the diplomatic spotlight, there are indications that Egyptian intelligence chief Mohamed Raafat Shehata has been heavily involved in the negotiations with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel behind the scenes. Shehata is reportedly delivering a news conference this evening, at which point a truce may be announced. There is also another layer of complexity to factor in. Hamas is not the sole representative of the Palestinians in Cairo. Egyptian mediators have been negotiating with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The latter, which has much closer links to Iran (which likely has an interest in prolonging the conflict), has claimed responsibility for firing several Fajr-5 rockets and is allegedly part of a joint military command with Hamas that is controlling the long-range rocket attacks. Stratfor sources in Egypt, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have separately claimed that Palestinian Islamic Jihad is in control of at least some of the Iranian-made Fajr-5 rockets and launchers. If this is true, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad is not simply serving as a convenient front for Hamas, then Hamas' commitment to a cease-fire must involve Palestinian Islamic Jihad. To this end, Palestinian Islamic Jihad chief Ramadan Abdullah Mohammed Shallah has been in Cairo for negotiations over a cease-fire and has been dealing with both Hamas and Egypt. An Egyptian source claims that Morsi has held frequent meetings with Shallah in trying to obtain guarantees on a cessation of rocket attacks. For now, it appears those talks are bearing fruit and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are on the same page in moving toward a cease-fire. The questions now are whether Israel feels a ground operation is still necessary and whether it has exhausted the diplomatic negotiations to move ahead. Gone are the days when Egyptian intelligence could mediate a truce between Israel and Hamas alone. The shifting dynamics over the past year -- from the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to Hamas' decision to publicly distance itself from Iran and position itself in the Muslim Brotherhood orbit while receiving Iranian weapons transfers, to Iran's attempts to maintain leverage in the Levant through groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad -- seem to be greatly complicating an already trying negotiation effort.

Aging Monarchy in a Time of Change

Aging Monarchy in a Time of Change

معهد الامن القومي في تل أبيب

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz has died in a Geneva hospital. The death of Nayef, thought to be 79, came as no surprise, for he had been seriously ill for the past several years. Nayef was only named crown prince in October 2011, following the death of Prince Sultan. Now, King Abdullah must nominate a new heir for the second time in 9 months.

With a median age of 25.3, Saudi Arabia’s population is younger than the global average. But you would not know that from the Kingdom’s leadership. Those at the top of the Saudi royal pyramid are old, and the aging of the leadership could have geopolitical implications. Specifically, the advanced age and failing health of King Abdullah should raise concerns about the future stability of the oil giant in the face of nemesis Iran and the turmoil rocking the Arab world.

The royal family, so it seems, has been preparing for Defense Minister Prince Salman, 77, Nayef's full brother, to take over power in the Kingdom. On November 2011, the former Riyadh regional governor was appointed defense minister, replacing than Crown Prince Sultan, suggesting he is next in line to rule. Salman is the only senior potential heir who is well enough to work. But even Prince Salman’s health is far from perfect: he underwent spine surgery in the United States (in 2010), has had at least one stroke, and has an arm that (despite physiotherapy) does not function fully. The official Saudi media have already been preparing the country for Salman's ascent, wanting to show that somebody is in charge. Saudi media have been touting the defense minister as a wise administrator who could act as mediator to settle disputes between family members as well as handle foreign policy.

Nayef had a reputation for being a hard-liner and a conservative. He was believed to be closer than many of his brothers to the powerful Wahhabi religious establishment that gives legitimacy to the royal family, and he at times worked to give a freer hand to the religious police who enforce strict social rules. He was interior minister in charge of internal security forces since 1975, and was known to have a "strong fist" against the kingdom's Shiite minority and for his fierce crackdown against al-Qaeda's following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. He later claimed that Jews were responsible for the attacks.

The lack of transparency regarding succession in Saudi Arabia has fueled speculation about who will succeed the 89-year-old King Abdullah, who has not been working on a daily basis for at least three years and had three back surgeries in 12 months. Abdullah rarely ventures outside his palace, and his brief meetings with visitors are photo opportunities directed at the Saudi state-controlled media. The royal house is making extraordinary efforts to project an image of business as usual.

The succession issue is not risk free, if only because most of King Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud’s living sons are old and in ill health, while all other candidates lack experience in running the Kingdom. In addition, the process is attended by fierce struggles, generally occurring behind the scenes, making it difficult to predict what the Saudi regime might look like in the coming years.

.Before the Arab Spring, nothing would limit the term of Arab rulers other than their own life spans. In one of the least stable regions of the globe, they are the ones still supplying the façade of stability. In the short term Nayef's death is not expected to trigger any major changes in Saudi oil and foreign policy. However, even this veneer of stability is no longer certain given the advanced ages of the rulers and the danger that the expected changing of the generational guard will undermine stability. The Saudi case is unique only in that the holy places of Islam are within its borders, it is the flag-bearer of the Sunni-Arab camp, and it has the largest reserves of oil in the world.

Until now, maintaining governmental stability was linked to succession going from brother to brother rather than from father to son; this has ensured the choice of a successor with experience in managing the Kingdom but has also created an aging pool of potential heirs. Consequently, it was decided as early as 1992 in the Basic Law of Governance that a successor could also be selected from among Ibn Saud’s grandsons.

In the long term, the kingdom cannot evade translating the law into practice. But the succession may be no less complicated when the crown moves down a generation to one of Ibn Saud's grandsons. Balancing the interests of the various wings of the family, the children of former kings and of princes will be a delicate task. The more prominent grandsons include Mecca Governor Prince Khaled al-Faisal, a sun of the late king Faisal and brother to foreign minister. Khalid, 73. Others include Eastern Province Governor Prince Mohammed bin Fahd, National Guard chief Prince Miteb bin Abdullah and Deputy Interior Minister Prince Muhammed bin Nayef. Muhammad, a rising star, serving as the de facto Interior Minister and in charge of the war on terrorism, has good working relations with his counterparts in the U.S.

As part of his desire to limit the power of the Sudairi branch of the family, but also in order to ensure a smoother transition of power by consensus, King Abdullah established an "Allegiance Council" in 2006. The group, numbering thirty-five members, has the authority to appoint a king under circumstances such as the death of the reigning monarch, the successive deaths of the heir apparent and the king, and illness or other disability that prevents the king from functioning.

Saudi Arabia’s ability to serve as a counterweight to the rise of Iran and as a pillar of strength for American policy in the region is intimately linked to the stability of the House of Saud and the need to manage the succession smoothly. The fact that the king too might die in the near future is liable to challenge new institutions that are meant to preserve continuity of governance. The challenges facing the Kingdom require the transfer of the crown to a third generation prince who will keep the pace and direction of the necessary political and social reforms aimed at reconciling conservative Islamic traditions with the growing needs of a youthful population.